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Modem Military Justice
CHARLES M. SCHIESSER*
and DANIEL H. BENSON**
No less an authority than the venerable John Henry Wigmore once for-
mulated an apologia in 1921 for the rough and ready military justice of
World War I in the following language:
The military system can say this for itself: It knows what it
wants; and it systematically goes in and gets it.
Civilian criminal justice does not even know what it wants;
much less does it resolutely go in and get anything.
Military justice wants discipline-that is, action in obedience
to regulations and orders; this being absolutely necessary for
prompt, competent, and decisive handling of masses of men. The
court-martial system supplies the sanction of this discipline. It
takes on the features of Justice because it must naturally per-
form the process of inquiring in a particular case, what was the
regulation or order, and whether it was in fact obeyed. But its
object is discipline.
The civilian penal system, on the other hand has not even
formulated what it wants. Some still say Retribution to the in-
dividual, some say Prevention of other wrongdoers; some say
not Retribution, but Reformation of the individual; and most
ignore a fundamental element, viz., the public reaffirmation of
the community's principles of right and wrong.'
Surprisingly enough, the principal opponent of the system of military
* Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army; Executive Officer, Defense Appellate
Division, United States Army Judiciary, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Concordia College,
1955; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1958; L.L.M., Georgetown Law School, 1963;
currently a graduate student at the George Washington University National Law
Center; member of the Minnesota and District of Columbia Bars.
** Major, United States Army; Military Judge assigned to the 7th Judicial Circuit,
United States Army, Fort Bliss, Texas; B.A., University of Texas, 1958; J.D., Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law, 1961; member of the Texas and District of Columbia
Bars. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the views of either The Judge Advocate General's Corps or
any other governmental agency.
1. Wigmore, Lessons from Military Justice, 4 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 151 (1921).
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justice that existed at that time was a Brigadier General in the United
States Army, Samuel T. Ansell. 2 Thus, as is so often true, stereotype
characters do not really exist in fact. Instead of what one would expect,
one finds the brillant, independent, civilian legal scholar8 defending what
was then a harsh, summary military justice system, while a member of the
Establishment, an Army Brigadier General, jeopardized and ultimately lost
his career 4 by advocating sweeping, but unacceptable, reforms.
The point is that generalizations are highly misleading and quite fre-
quently inaccurate. It is important to note this at the outset, for it is
desired that what is said in this article concerning military justice be taken
at face value; that it be understood neither as unreasoned criticism of what
is now a sophisticated system of justice, nor as an abject acceptance of those
portions of that system that need change.
In some respects perhaps we can draw an anology between criticism
of military justice from within and the writings of a group called the Under-
ground Church in contemporary theology. Internal critics accept the Es-
tablishment in all of its forms. They expect change only through lawful
and recognized modes, but they find things in the system that are not to
their liking and that need change. These critics advocate "surgical re-
newal" from within the Establishment, much as the Underground Church
advocates revolutionary reform from the "basement of the structure". 5 In-
ternal critics value highly the military justice structure, but they see the
need for further improvements.
This attitude, we believe, is appropriate for our times. As Melvin
Belli has observed, "Today's lawyer who thinks antiquity in law is its es-
sential ingredient, who feels that law is and must forever-more remain a
laggard . . .has not read the opinions of courts of last resort during the
last ten years." 6  Belli goes on to assert that, as the late Bishop-lawyer-
theologian James A. Pike said, law is "where the action is."'7 We are con-
vinced that this is true of military, as well as civilian, law.
Pollock and Maitland noted: "Such is the unity of all history that anyone
2. See Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General Samuel
T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967).
3. Wigmore was not entirely a civilian; he was a reserve colonel in the Judge
Advocate General's Department. His comments made in 1919-20 are being used today
in support of the military system of trial.
4. General Ansell was reduced from temporary Brigadier General to permanent
Lieutenant Colonel on March 4, 1919. Hearings on S. 64 on the Establishment of
Military Justice Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. 160-64 (1919).
5. See THE UNDERGROUND CHURCH viii (M. Boyd ed. 1960).
6. 1 M. BELLI, THE LAW REVOLT 3-4 (1968).
7. Id. at 21.
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who endeavors to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears
a seamless web." 8 Certainly we feel this, in attempting to tell a piece of the
story of modern military justice. Obviously the reader should be aware of
the origins of American military law, and particularly the fact that it began
as a copy of the British system, which itself was a copy of the early
Roman military law.9 The Articles of War functioned well at first in a
small professional Army. But the needs of the Nation to defend itself in-
creased, and with the increase the Army was changed into a predominantly
civilian military force containing scientists, technologists, and specialists.
There was no corresponding change in military law, however, and the
proper administration of military justice floundered. 10 At the end of World
War I, military law was subjected to studies aimed at reform." This also
led to the now famous internal dispute in the Army between General
Crowder, who resisted change and General Ansell, who sought it. With
the victory of General Crowder, and the vanquishing of General Ansell,
the hope for modernizing the Articles of War faded, and complaints against
the system diminished with the size of the armed forces. 12 The com-
plaints arose anew after World War II, but this time post-war criticism
was more intense, and support for reform more forceful. Studies were
conducted inside' 8 and outside of the Army, 14 and they culminated in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.' 5 This new Code muted criticism, but
it did not end it.l6 Today criticism is increasing,' 7 and new reformers call
for change.
8. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1 (4th ed. 1959).
9. G. DAvIS, MILITARY LAW 1-12 (1898); W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 15-24 (2d ed. 1920); Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and
the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L.J. 52 (1919); Morgan, The Background of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953).
10. Brown, supra note 2; Sutherland, The Constitution, the Civilian, and Military
Justice, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 215-16 (1961).
11. Hearings on S. 64, supra note 4; Morgan, Military Justice, reprinted in Hearings
on S. 64, supra note 4, at 1388-95 (1919); Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L. Q.
1 (1919); Ansell, Some Reforms in our System of Military Justice, 32 YALE L.J.
146 (1922).
12. Brown, supra note 2.
13. S. Doc. No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-23 (1946); Report of the War Depart-
ment Advisory Committee on Military Justice, 14 J.B.A.D.C. 69 (1947).
14. Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Armed Services Comm. on H.R.
2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (1949); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Comm. on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (1949).
15. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
16. See Keeffe, JAG Justice in Korea, 6 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1 (1956).
17. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Glasser, Justice and Captain
Levy, 12 COLUM. F. 46 (1969); Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22
MAINE L. REV. 3 (1970). See also West, The Command Domination of the Military
Judicial Process, Aug. 10, 1969 (unpublished thesis in the George Washington Uni-
versity Law School, Washington, D.C.) which recommends that military justice be
completely removed from the control of military commanders.
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What follows are some observations on Military Justice which we offer
as working military practitioners in the hope that, in some small way, we
may assist in the continuing advance of military law.
Contemporary Background
Military commentators' s have praised the many significant advances made
over the past few years in military justice. Generally they have treated
both the problems that exist and the services themselves in a general
sense, as if the armed forces constitute one composite unit, where changes
acceptable at the highest levels automatically become acceptable to field
units. Moreover, military critics'9 have approached both the problems and
the services in the same manner; thus an alleged arbitrary application of
military criminal law at one post is used to support a claim that all mili-
tary law is arbitrary.20 Both positions are, we submit, erroneous.
Military justice is, in fact, regarded by the Department of Defense, its
subordinate departments, and most field commanders as a system designed
to provide fair and impartial trials for individuals accused of criminal of-
fenses. A natural incidental effect of such a system will be increased
discipline through the exoneration of the innocent and the punishment of
the guilty. However, due to the enormous size of the armed forces, a
few exceptions may exist from time to time. An occasional field com-
mander, generally through mis-advice or misunderstanding, will still view
military justice solely as an instrument of discipline. Of course, this view
is supported by Wigmore's comments in 1921, but it ignores the fact that
military justice is not as rudimentary as it was at that time. Certainly it is
true that the armed services generally emphasize the many good points
about military justice, and their representatives attempt to avoid discussing
the few deficiencies that exist. We feel this is largely a natural reflex ac-
tion caused by the military's critics who emphasize only deficiencies and
sometimes ignore the many recent advances made in military law. But
neither the military's use of myopic vision when focusing on defects, nor the
18. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Rights of the Convicted, 4 TRIAL, Feb.-Mar. 1968, at 14;
Hodson, Is there Justice in the Military?, 15 ARmY RESERVE, Nov.-Dec. 1969, at 22-24;
O'Malley, Mapp, Miranda and the Accused, 4 TRIAL, Feb.-Mar. 1968, at 10; Westerman,
Court of Military Review, 24 ARMY DIGEST, Oct. 1969, at 11.
19. See Glasser and West, supra note 17.
20. E.g., it was recently stated: "None of the travesties of justice perpetuated
under the UCMJ is really very surprising for military law has always been and con-
tinues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not justice." Glasser, supra note 17
at 49. This statement is based primarily on one case, the court-martial of Captain
Howard B. Levy. See Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967);




critic's blindness when advances in military law are discussed, is a satis-
factory basis for study. In the long run, the patient's health will be more
improved by proper diagnosis and treatment, than by either a refusal to
admit the illness, or a desire for the patient's demise.
It is appropriate to being, we believe, by noting the possible confusion
which arise when one compares the Department of Defenses's enthusiastic
endorsement of the recent amendments to the Code brought about by the
Military Justice Act of 1968,21 with the Department's stated attitude toward
those amendments prior to their enactment. Field commanders, and par-
ticularly their legal advisors, were aware that early in 1966 military spokes-
men22 had opposed: (1) a mandatory requirement that a military judge
be appointed to any special court-martial authorized to adjudge a punitive
discharge; 28 (2) the right of an accused to be tried before a military judge
alone without the consent of the convening authority who ordered the
trial; 24 (3) the establishment of a field, or trial, judiciary by law in all of
the armed forces; 25 (4) the appointment of civilian chief judges to inter-
mediate appellate courts; 26 (5) prohibitions against the preparation by ap-
pellate judges of efficiency reports on other judges;27 (6) prohibitions
against the consideration of an officer's performance as defense counsel in
the preparation of efficiency reports;28 (7) abolition of the summary court-
martial; 29 and (8) most of the provisions in the bills which would extend
21. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-936 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-936
(1964).
22. See Joint Hearings on S. 745-762 and S. 2906-2907 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-3 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as 1966 Hearings].
23. "We are opposed to the provision that a special court-martial cannot adjudge a
bad conduct discharge unless a law officer [now a military judge] has been detailed
and has been present at the trial." Id. at 17.
24. "The Department of Defense believes that waiver of a trial before the court
members should be conditioned on the consent of the Government, and the authority
who convenes the court is the logical person to determine whether this consent
should be granted." Id. at 17.
25. "We are opposed to the features of S. 745 which would require the establish-
ment of a field, or trial judiciary, and would specify by law details as to the assignment
and duties of the law officer." Id. at 21.
26. "The Department of Defense is not persuaded that the administration of military
justice in the Armed Forces would be improved if senior military officers ...were
replaced by civilian employees." Id. at 22.
27. "The Department of Defense also opposes enactment of the related bill, S. 755,
which would prohibit the preparation of efficiency or fitness reports by members of
boards of review with respect to any other member of the same or another board of
review." Id.
28. "W~e opposed that portion of S. 749 which would prevent the performance of
an officer as defense counsel from being taken into consideration in preparing
efficiency or fitness reports." Id.
29. "The Department of Defense now opposes S. 759, which would abolish the
summary court-martial." Id. at 24.
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greater protection to service members being processed for administrative
separation from the armed forces by military boards of officers.
80
Regardless of the merit of the bills invloved, field commanders and their
staffs probably believed that the Department of Defense's 1966 opposition
to the amendments was the permanent official position of the Department.
These officials were intimately aware of the long and painful legislative
history of the improvements, and they knew that the Department had never
wholeheartedly endorsed the improvements prior to their enactment.
It is partly this dichotomy between past and recent public pronounce-
ments of the Department which has affected military justice at the unit
level. A few field commanders and their staffs were convinced that the
1966 position of the Department opposing change was the true attitude of
the Department which should be exemplified in the day-to-day operations
of military justice at the unit level. Thus implementation of the Military
Justice Act varied from command to command, and where there was an
unfavorable attitude by local officials towards the changes, there was dis-
content among the ordinary servicemen, the consumers of military justice.
The attitude of the individual serviceman is important, and we submit that
the consumer perspective, suggested by Edmond Cahn,81 is the proper one
in this instance if we are to understand adequately the continuing dissatisfac-
tion of the ordinary serviceman with military justice. As Cahn pointed out,
it is traditional for jurists of the official perspective to justify the legal
system in terms of averages, wholesale statistics, and overall performances;
but seen in the consumer perspective, these defenses are dubious at best:
If an innocent man is sent to prison or the electric chair, there is
something not quite adequate about assuring him (or his widow)
that miscarriages do not happen very often; the man may have a
stubborn feeling that he is entitled to justice in his particular
case. 32
Accordingly, we must be aware that the Department of Defense's praise of
the changes brought about by the Military Justice Act of 1968 after its
enactment is only now overcoming its prior official position in opposition.
We must also realize that the 1966 hearings remain available as reading
materials for field commanders and their legal advisors. Thus many mili-
tary officials may be inclined to believe that the current praise is merely a
commendable acceptance by the Department of unwanted changes that are
now the law.
With this background, we must go on and attempt to penetrate the
30. Id. at 355-401.
31. Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1963).
32. Id. at 16.
494 [Vol. XIX:489
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military system of trial. We must examine the "sweeping changes in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice effected by the Military Justice Act of
1968, '' 33 and the position of power of the commander who brings cases to
trial in the first instance.3 4
The Military Justice Act of 1968
The Military Justice Act of 196835 created trial and appellate military
judges,36 modernized military trial procedure,3 7 increased military accused's
rights to legal counsel,3 provided a system of post-trial "bail", 39 strength-
ened the ban on illegal command influence, 40 limited the use of the sum-
mary court-martial, 41 and strengthened post-conviction remedies. 42 The fol-
lowing discussion will set forth in more detail some of the principal changes
that were made from prior law, and will attempt to assess the modern
system of military justice.
Military Trial Judges
It has been stated that one of the primary purposes of the Military Justice
Act of 1968 was to make court-martial procedures more like those followed
in United States district courts, and that the military judge "has been given
functions and powers more closely allied to those of a federal district
judge, except that in a trial with court members, the members still deter-
mine the sentence.'43  This is not the only significant difference. There
are others, and these other differences are so important that it is not
realistic to comare a military judge with a federal district judge.
For example, a federal district judge may not be overruled by a layman
on an issue of law in dismissing a count of an indictment, yet a military
judge may be so overruled by the military commander who convened the
court-martial (usually a layman with no legal training) on an issue of
law. Paragraph 67f, Manual For Courts-Martial, 1969 (Revised edition),
provides in pertinent part:
33. Mounts & Sugarman, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (1969).
34. See text section, The Convening Authority: Locus Of Power, infra.
35. 10 U.S.C. § 801-936 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-936
(1964).
36. Id. §§ 826, 866 (Supp. IV, 1969).
37. Id. § 839(a).
38. Id. §§ 819, 827(c).
39. Id. § 857(d).
40. Id. § 837.
41. Id. § 820.
42. Id. §§ 869, 873.
43. Westerman, Court of Military Review, 24 ARMy DIGEST, Oct. 1969, at 11. See
also S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
1970]
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If a specification before a court-martial has been dismissed on
motion and the ruling does not amount to a finding of not guilty,
the convening authority may return the record to the court for
reconsideration of the ruling and any further appropriate action.
The same paragraph further provides:
To the extent that the matter in disagreement relates solely to a
question of law, as, for example, whether the charges allege an
offense cognizable by a court-martial, the military judge or the
president of a special court-martial without a military judge will
accede to the view of the convening authority.
This means that the convening authority, not the military judge, has the
power finally to determine at the trial level questions of law related to the
dismising of any specification. The Manual provides that where there is a
dispute concerning a question of fact, the convening authority may send the
case back to the court-martial for reconsideration, but in that situation the
military judge will exercise his "discretion" upon reconsideration of the
issue.44 In matters of this kind, the military judge is on the same level as
the lay president of a special court-martial sitting without a military judge.
In fact, the military judge is not completely a judge, as that term is
properly understood. However, he does purport to act like a judge in a
criminal court; he decides issues of law and fact in criminal cases (subject
to being overruled by the convening authority as we noted, supra); he an-
nounces findings of "guilty" or "not guilty", and he imposes sentences when
sitting alone (again subject to being overruled by the convening authority).
Because of his unique status, there is no precise counterpart of the
military judge in any other segment of our Government. But he is perhaps
most nearly analogous to a federal hearing examiner.45  Even this analogy
is not exact, however, and breaks down at several points. Even so, it may
be instructive to compare the two positions in order to highlight the present
true status of a military judge.
A federal hearing examiner's independence is significantly more secure
than that of a military judge. The Administrative Procedure Act 46 con-
tains specific provisions establishing true independence for the examiners
who hear administrative cases, and the Supreme Court has noted that en-
hancement of the status and functions of federal hearing examiners was one
of the important purposes of the movement for administrative reform that
44. 67f MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1969 (Revised edition) [hereinafter cited
as MCM, 1969 (Rev.)]. See United States v. Boehm, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R.
328 (1968). Compare this military procedure with 18 U.S.C. 3731 (Supp. IV, 1969)
regarding some of the Government's appeal rights within the federal system.
45. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. IV, 1969).
46. 5 U.S.C. 500-59 (1964).
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led to enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act.47  Examiners, for
example, are removable by the agency in which they are employed only
for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission
after opportunity for a hearing, and upon the record of such hearing. 48
Although this does not amount to a lifetime position,49 it gives a federal
hearing examiner far more independence than that enjoyed by a military
judge, who is subject to reassignment by his Judge Advocate General.
Further federal law requires assignment of examiners to cases in ro-
tation as far as practicable, and specifically prohibits performance by ex-
aminers of any duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as
examiners.50
As a House committee said: "The requirement of assignment of ex-
aminers 'in rotation' prevents an agency from disfavoring an examiner by
rendering him inactive, although examiners may be permitted to specialize
and be assigned mainly to cases for which they have so qualified." 51 There
is nothing to prevent a particular Judge Advocate General from "disfavoring"
a military judge by "rendering him inactive" as a judge; no hearing is
required, and no provisions of law exist to protect the military judge.5 2  In-
deed, a "normal reassignment" removing him from judicial duties, could
come in response to judicial acts which do not satisfactorily correspond to the
predominent philosophy within the armed forces.58
But even if the military judge lacks significant statutory protections ex-
tended by federal statutes to his brother, the federal hearing examiner, it is
still true that his real functions and powers closely resemble those of the
hearing examiner. Although he can not be equated to a federal hearing
examiner (and we do not so equate him), he is much closer to that position
than he is to the position of a federal district judge.
Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to state specifically that in making
this comparison, we do not seek to take from military judges any prestige
or status to which they are actually entitled. Nor do we mean to imply
in any way that there is something less important about being a federal
hearing examiner than being a federal district judge. The functions, status,
and duties of these three positions differ significantly, and it can not be said
47. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
48. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. IV, 1969).
49. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. IV, 1969).
51. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1946).
52. See In re Taylor, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 31 C.M.R. 13 (1961) where the Court
of Military Appeals refused to hear an appeal from the petitioner's decertification as a
law officer by his Judge Advocate General.
53. Military judges in the Army are under the assignment authority of The Judge
Advocate General of the Army.
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that one is necessarily "better" or "worse" than the others. They are dif-
ferent. But there has been such widespread undiscriminating comparison
of military judges with federal district judges, 54 that we desire to ask
whether the comparison is valid. We obviously feel that it is not, but we
do not want to be understood as opposed to the military judge concept as
such.
We think that the advances made by the military judge concept in the
Military Justice Act of 1968 are highly commendable, and the concept of
the military judge is a major step forward for military justice. Our concern
is that progress not stop with what we have now, since it is not enough; much
more must be done to give military judges the true independence and powers
that they need to function with real effectiveness in criminal trials. It is
our purpose merely to show that the military judge is, what he is not, and
what he could become. In doing this, it is necessary to clear away general
expressions of what the position entails, and look at the facts. The reasons
why we say the military judge is more like a federal hearing examiner than a
federal district judge are as follows: the military judge, like the hearing
examiner, can administer oaths,55 rule on offers of proof,56 authorize the
taking of depositions,57 receive relevant evidence, 58 regulate the course
of the proceedings, 59 hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of
the issues,60 dispose ofprocedural requests, 6' and make or recommend de-
cisions concerning the case in hearing.6 2 But also like a hearing examiner,
and quite unlike a federal district judge, a military judge actually makes
what amounts to only an initial determination of the major issues before
54. "[Olur aim [is] to assimilate the status of the law officer, wherever possible,
to that of a civilian judge of the Federal system." United States v. Biesak, 3 U.S.C.M.A.
714, 722, 14 C.M.R. 132, 140 (1954). See Cutler, The Right and Duty of the Law
Officer to Comment on the Evidence, 35 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1967); Grimm, Criminal
Justice in the Military Establishment, 37 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 14, 19 (1953); Miller, Who
Made the Law Officer a "Federal Judge"?, 4 MIL. L. REV. 39 (1959); O'Connell, Inde-
pendent Judiciary of the Army, 5 BOSTON BAR J. 21, 22 (1961).
55. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. H§ 842, 936
(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
56. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. § 839 (Supp.
IV, 1969).
57. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (4) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. § 849(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
58. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
59. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
60. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (6) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
61. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (7) (Supp. IV, 1969) with 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969).




him, not a final determination which is binding on the agency63 -in this
case, the military department concerned. Thus, although a military judge
finds an accused guilty, that finding is an initial determination only, and re-
mains so until the convening authority approves it.64 The same is true of
the sentence imposed by a military judge; it is in actuality no sentence at all
unless the convening authority approves it and orders it executed, and the
convening authority may disapprove any part or all of it in his sole discre-
tion.65 The convening authority may suspend a sentence; the military
judge has no power to do so.66 A military judge, as such, can neither order
an accused into confinement or release an accused from confinement, re-
gardless of the results of a trial, findings of guilty, findings of not guilty, or
imposition of a sentence. 67 A military judge has certain limited powers to
hold a person in contempt of court, but even that finding and sentence, if
any, has no legal effect whatsoever and can not be ordered executed except
by the subsequent approval of the convening authority.68  A military judge
has no power to enforce the orders of his court;6 9 enforcement of the orders
of a military judge depends entirely upon discretionary action taken in
response thereto by the military commanders concerned. 70 In this respect,
even hearing examiners may actually have more authority to enforce their
orders than military judges.
The crux of the matter has been well stated by Winthrop in his early
treatise on military law:
Courts-martial of the United States, although their legal sanc-
tion is no less than that of the federal courts, being equally with
these authorized by the Constitution, are, unlike these, not a por-
tion of the Judiciary of the United States, and are thus not in-
cluded among the 'inferior' courts which Congress 'may from
time to time ordain and establish.' . . . Not belonging to the
judicial branch of Government, it follows that courts-martial must
pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact
simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him
in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing disci-
pline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his au-
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 557 (Supp. IV, 1969); K. DAVIS, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 314-18 (1951).
64. See, Arts. 60 and 64, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 860, 864 (1964).
65. See, Art. 64, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1964).
66. See 10 U.S.C. § 871 (Supp. IV, 1969).
67. 21c, MCM, 1969 (Rev.).
68. 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1964); 118, MCM, 1969 (Rev.).
69. In fact, it is not "his" court, but it is the convening authority's court. As in the
past, no court exists until a commander gives it life through a military order. See
United States v. Robinson, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 674, 33 C.M.R. 206 (1963).
70. See art. 64, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1964).
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thorized military representatives. 71
Winthrop went on to point out:
Thus indeed, strictly, a court-martial is not a court in the full
sense of the term, or as the same is understood in the civil phrase-
ology. It has no common law powers whatever, but only such pow-
ers as are vested in it by express statute, or may be derived from
military usage . . . . It is indeed a creature of orders, and ex-
cept in so far as an independent discretion may be given it by
statute, it is as much subject to the orders of a competent su-
perior as is any military body or person.
72
Winthrop has laid bare the heart of the problem. Just as a court-martial is
still not a true court, so a military judge is still not a true judge. Just as a
court-martial is called into existence by a military order, and by a similar
order is dissolved when its purpose is accomplished, so a military judge is
detailed to a court-martial by a military order, and it is only by such
military order that a military judge has any power whatsoever to act. When
the court-martial is dissolved by military order, the power and authority of
the military judge to act is also dissolved, and is not revived until another
court-martial convening order is issued by a military commander.
7"
As we have stated, we regret that this is so. Military judges should be
more like federal district judges, with most of the powers and authority of
those judges relating to criminal proceedings. But since they are not, it is
not helpful to proclaim that the law officer is now a federal judge: first,
because that is not the truth, and second, because it is only when we honestly
recognize and accept military judges for what they are that we can begin
the task of preparing corrective legislation to make them what they should
be.
Military Appellate Judges
The Uniform Code of Military Justice did not provide for appellate judges
for the military services. Instead, each Judge Advocate General was di-
rected to constitute in his Office one or more boards of review consisting
of at least three members, either officers or civilians, admitted to the prac-
tice of law before the highest court of a state or a federal court.74 Where
the court-martial sentence extended to death, dismissal, or punitive dis-
charge, involved a general or flag officer, or a sentence of confinement for
one year or more, review before these boards was mandatory. 75 The ac-
71. W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49.
72. Id.
73. See, Art. 22, UCMJ 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1964).
74. Art. 66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1964).
75. Art. 66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1964).
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cused, upon request, was represented by a military lawyer at no expense
to him, and he could employ his own civilian attorney at his own expense. 6
The powers granted to the boards of review were extensive. In consider-
ing a record of trial, the board could weigh the evidence, judge the credi-
bility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact. It acted
upon both the findings and sentence as approved by the convening au-
thority. While it could not increase the severity of sentences, it could, and
did, reduce inappropriately severe sentences thus providing appellate review
of military sentences. The board could correct errors by reassessing the
sentence, ordering rehearings, or ordering charges dismissed.
It was apparent that these boards of review were not administrative
boards at all, but intermediate appellate courts. Hence, it was not sur-
prising that a proposal to rename them should arise. This came, in at
least one instance, in the form of S. 748. 7 That bill contained provisions
to establish courts of military review by statute as appellate courts for each
of the military departments, and locate them within their respective depart-
ments only for administrative purposes. Appellate judges, appointed by
the secretary of a department, would comprise as many three-judge panels
as were necessary. These judges could be either military officers or civilians,
and one of them would be designated by the Secretary as chief judge, but
only civilian judges would be eligible to so act. The judges must not only
be qualified attorneys, have not less than six years' experience in the
practice of military justice, but must meet such other qualifications as the
secretary concerned might prescribe. The composition of the panels would
be determined by the chief judge. He could require the court to sit en banc
in any particular case, as could one-half of the judges of the court. Judges
of one military department could sit on an appellate court of another mili-
tary department when authorized to do so by the secretaries concerned.
At least one judge of each panel had to be a civilian who had no past mili-
tary connection such as being a retired officer of the armed forces. Mili-
tary officers appointed as judges would receive a three year term of office,
while civilian judges would serve during good behavior removable only for
physical or mental disability or other good cause shown, upon notice of and
a hearing ordered by the appropriate Secretary. Any person appointed to a
court would be known as a military judge, and military officers in their
work relating to court matters would be so addressed rather than by rank.
The chief judge of the courts of military review could prescribe uniform
rules of procedures binding upon all of the courts. No changes in the
76. Art. 70, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964).
77. 1966 Hearings at 497-02.
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jurisdiction of the courts was contemplated from what it had been under
the boards of review.
The Department of Defense objected to several aspects of this proposed
bill. It considered the requirement that there be a civilian chief judge of
each court harmful to the morale of military lawyers; that it would prove
difficult to obtain civilians with six years' of military justice practice; that
fixed tenure for military officers would make these officers unavailable for
other duties during unusual circumstances; and, that members of the then
current boards of review were independent so that tenure was unnecessary.
78
The provisions regarding courts of military review in the Military Justice
Act of 1968 contained much less than what had been proposed, but much
more than what had existed prior thereto. A court of military review was
established for each department, not by statute, but by the respective Judge
Advocates General. 79 Each court has the authority to subdivide into panels
of not less than three appellate military judges, and cases may be heard
either by panel or en banc. Appellate judges may be either civilian or mili-
tary lawyers, as may the chief judge who is empowered to determine on
which panel his subordinate judges will sit and which among them shall be
designated senior judge of the panel. Uniform rules of procedure for the
courts, however, continue to be the responsibility of the Judge Advocates
General.
8 0
Although the law officer was merely renamed as a military judge and
granted very limited additional authority, the members of the boards of re-
view already possessed the powers of appellate judges so that renaming
them judges resulted in conforming their titles to their existing duties. In
the Army, as soon as the appellate judges were sworn in, they changed their
practice of hearing oral arguments attired in military uniforms to judicial
robes, and these judges have asserted that their court has the authority to
issue extraordinary writs in aid of their appellate jurisdiction.8'
It has been easy to observe that redesignating the boards of review as a
court of military review in the Army has resulted in much more than a
change of name. First, it appears clear from the early months of the Army
Court of Military Review's operation that civilian appellate judges are un-
necessary as military judges have acted in an exceedingly fair manner. And
while the authors favor tenure for appellate military judges, some escape
78. Id. at 21-22, 504-07.
79. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (Supp. IV, 1969).
80. Id. § 866(f).
81. Westerman, Court of Military Review, 24 ARMY DIGEST 10 (1969). See United
States v. Epely, No. 419683 (ACMR Apr. 6, 1970); United States v. Draughon, No.




clause must be built into any tenure provision to provide for rapid person-
nel changes that might be necessary in the event of a national emergency.
But on balance, there is no doubt that the establishment of intermediate ap-
pellate courts has advanced and improved the military justice structure.
Modernized Trial Procedures
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice prior to its recent amendment,
a general court-martial could not function unless the law officer (now mili-
tary judge), at least five members, counsel, and the accused were present.
8 2
Hence, preliminary issues of an interlocutory nature could not be disposed
of without first having the members of the court present. This resulted in a
practice of gathering the trial participants on the date of the hearing, open-
ing the court-martial with the members present, and then excusing the mem-
bers for, normally two to four hours, while interlocutory motions, and legal
problems, were resolved by the law officer. Such a practice was, of course,
highly unsatisfactory to both the Government and the accused as there was
additional cost to the Government and fear by the accused that the court
members might be angered by their waste of essential time, particularly in a
war zone such as Vietnam. This situation has been corrected by a statutory
authorization to conduct Article 39(a) sessions by the judge alone,83 as an
authorized part of the court-martial trial, after charges have been served
and referred for trial to a court-martial composed of a military judge and
members. Such a session may also be held after reversal by an appellate
court for limited purposes.84  The military judge may determine whether
trial by the judge alone is desired, hear and determine motions raising de-
fenses and objections, hear and rule on any matter over which the judge
has authority, such as the admission of evidence, hold the arraignment and
receive the accused's plea, when authorized by regulations of the Secretary
concerned, 85 and perform any procedural function under the general au-
thority of the military judge. If an accused desires trial by the military judge
alone, the judge may announce that the court-martial has "assembled", and
conduct the entire trial. If the accused desires trial by members, the mili-
tary judge may still receive the plea, and if it is "guilty", determine pro-
vidency, and enter a finding of guilt. After the members assemble, he need
only advise them that the accused's plea of guilty has been determined to
be provident and has resulted in his conviction by the military judge. There-
82. Art. 39, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839 (1964).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 839 (Supp. IV, 1969).
84. 53d, MCM, 1969 (Rev.).
85. This is authorized in the Army by § 2-18b, C3, Army Regulations 27-10
(Nov. 26, 1968).
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after, he would instruct the members on their duties to find an appropriate
sentence.8 6
Beyond question, the military judge is much more free to arrange and
process his docket than was the law officer. The liberal provisions of Arti-
cle 39(a) and the Revised Manual allow the military judge to exercise ef-
fective close control over his docket, if he will but take the initiative.
Through such judicial supervision, cases may be brought to trial in an ex-
peditious fashion, thus eliminating many complaints about denial of a speedy
trial. Even if counsel tend to be dilatory as they sometimes do, in bringing
their cases to trial, the military judge is now able to police the docket in
such a way as to move the traffic along efficiently.
For example, the military judges of one Army judicial circuit operate
their dockets in much the same way as do many civilian courts. Each Fri-
day is reserved for an early-morning call of the calendar. All attorneys ap-
pear in court and answer when their cases are called. At such sessions, the
military judge inquires of counsel: (1) the nature of the offense charged,
(2) whether the accused desires trial by military judge alone or by a
military judge sitting with court members, (3) the anticipated pleas of the
accused, and (4) whether either side desires the court to hear motions prior
to trial of the case on its merits. Flexibility is maintained in such calendar
calls, and if for one reason or another a defense counsel is not ready to indi-
cate the anticipated plea, or if the accused desires not to exercise his option
concerning trial by military judge alone until a later date, no issue is made
of the matter. The calendar call is in no sense a part of either the Article
39(a) session, or the trial of the case on its merits. Instead, it is in the na-
ture of a preliminary inquiry in the presence of counsel for both sides con-
cerning the disposition of matters which will facilitate trial of the case. The
authority for such inquiry prior to trial is found in paragraph 61, Manual For
Courts-Martial, 1969 (Revised edition):
A court-martial should not be called to order for any session
of the trial of a new case until the military judge . . . after ex-
amining the order convening the court and making an informal
inquiry of the personnel present has determined that the accused
and, if the presence of the members is required at such session,
a quorum of the court are present for the trial of the case ....
The military judge should also inquire into the existence of a re-
quest by the accused for trial by the military judge alone in ap-
propriate cases.
Although John P. Frank is critical of calendar calls, primarily on the basis
of the billable time lost by private practitioners in attending such calls,8 7
86. See Appendix 8, MCM, 1969 (Rev.).
87. J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 130 (1969).
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military practitioners are not confronted with a similar problem regarding
fees, and experience with the calendar call indicates that it is efficient and
effective for purposes of military justice administration. In particular, it is
highly desirable that the military judge assume control of the case at the
earliest possible point, particularly where there may be requests for produc-
tion of evidence, motions for depositions or other immediately needed relief
of one kind or another, or similar related matters that can be handled much
more effectively by the military judge than by the trial counsel acting alone
or through the convening authority.
If complicated issues are likely to arise during trial of the case, the com-
bination of a weekly calendar call and early Article 39(a) sessions enables
the military judge to become aware of the situation, and he may then call
upon counsel to provide assistance to the court through briefs or written sub-
mission of requests for particular instructions that may be desired upon trial
of the case. Each judge will vary the procedure to meet the requirements
of the local jurisdiction, but there is much leeway now for the creative solu-
tion of many of the routine problems that tend to encumber the efficient ad-
ministration of court business. The present system is a decided improve-
ment over the former procedures.
Right to Legal Counsel
As a matter of historical interest, it appears clear that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel "was never thought or intended or considered, by those who
drafted the sixth amendment or by those who lived contemporaneously with
its adoption, to apply to prosecutions before courts-martial. 88 The service-
man's right to legal counsel stems instead from laws enacted by the Congress.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice prior to the Military Justice
Act of 1968, both trial and defense counsel detailed to general courts-martial
were required to be lawyers who were certified as competent in military
law by their respective Judge Advocates General.89 After a few years of
operating under the Code, decisional law extended the right to representa-
tion by certified defense counsel during the military counterpart of the
grand jury, the Article 32 investigation, and prohibited the rather wide-
spread practice of permitting nonlawyers to represent accused at their re-
quest in general court-martial trials.90 These changes made certified law-
88. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72
HARv. L. REV. 1, 49 (1958).
89. Art. 27, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827(b)(2) (1964).
90. In United States v. Tomaszewski, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 266, 24 C.M.R. 76 (1957), the
Court of Military Appeals confirmed the military accused's right to be represented by
an attorney during the pretrial hearing. Later, in United States v. Kraskouskas,
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yers available as defense counsel in all pretrial proceedings leading to, and
in all trials by, general court-martial.
At the same time that lawyers were being provided in general courts-
martial trials, the Code limited accused persons tried by special courts-mar-
tial to the options of employing civilian counsel at their own expense, or re-
questing military lawyers who would only be provided if reasonably avail-
able.91 Normally, at least in the Army, lawyers were found to be unavail-
able, and detailed defense counsel would usually be nonlawyers.Y2 In 1963
the United States Court of Military Appeals was forced into deciding whether
accused persons before special courts-martial were entitled to lawyer de-
fense counsel, because one of the Navy's intermediate appellate tribunals
held the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to legally qualified counsel
in a special court-martial case where the accused was convicted of six spec-
ifications of larceny, and was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge and
accessory penalties.93 The Judge Advocate General of the Navy there-
after, under his statutory certification authority, ordered review by the
United States Court of Military Appeals. 94 Judge Kilday, who authored the
court's opinion, stated the traditional view that "qualifications of counsel for
courts-martial are a matter within the sound discretion of Congress,"9 5 as the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to trials by courts-martial. Chief Judge
Quinn and Judge Fedguson both concluded that the Sixth Amendment applies
to trials by courts-martial, with the former finding the provision of non-
lawyer counsel pursuant to Article 27(c) adequate compliance with the
Constitution,9" and the latter finding that the accused was denied no rights
since he chose to be represented by the detailed nonlawyer officers who
defended him.97 Both the Chief Judge and Judge Ferguson believed it
was undesirable, but legally permissible, to permit nonlawyers to practice
before special courts-martial empowered to impose bad conduct discharges. s
Litigation concerning the use of nonlawyers as counsel in special courts-
martial also arose outside of the military criminal system. In 1965, Stap-
9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958) the court required counsel before general
courts-martial to be fully qualified attorneys.
91. Only when the trial counsel was an attorney was it required that the defense
counsel be a lawyer. See UCMJ art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964).
92. In 1966 the military services reported "requests for appointment of legally
qualified counsel at a special court-martial are rarely granted in the Army, because
these counsel are in fact not often reasonably available .... 1966 Hearings at 912.
93. United States v. Culp, No. 63-00442 (NBR May 31, 1963).
94. United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
95. Id. at 216, 33 C.M.R. at 428.
96. Id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429.
97. Id. at 219, 33 C.M.R. at 431.
98. Id. at 218, 221, 33 C.M.R. at 430, 433.
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ley, 99 a military prisoner in Utah, brought a writ of habeas corpus to secure
his release from confinement imposed by special court-martial. As he was
indigent, he had requested that a lawyer defense counsel be detailed to repre-
sent him, but this request was denied. The detailed military defense counsel
were, as in most Army cases at the time, nonlawyers with little or no ex-
perience in court-martial proceedings. Upon advice of nonlawyer counsel,
he pleaded guilty pursuant to a pretrial agreement with the convening au-
thority limiting any period of adjudged confinement to no more than two
months.
The district judge determined that the nonlawyers who defended Stapley
"were wholly unqualified to act and failed to act as 'counsel' with respect to
military law, procedure, trial or defense practicality, or at all"'100 and he stated
that the trial "constituted no more than an idle ceremony or form in ac-
cordance with a script arranged beforehand. . . ."10o The writ was granted
and Stapley was freed. The government did not appeal.
It soon became evident that Stapley was a unique case largely compelled
by its individual facts. LeBallister v. Warden'02 involved a military accused
convicted at two separate special courts-martial for absence without leave,
and each conviction resulted in a sentence to confinement at hard labor for
six months, as well as partial forfeitures of pay. No request for either
civilian or military lawyer counsel was made, and representation was by
regularly detailed nonlawyer counsel. LeBallister sought a writ of habeas
corpus because he was not afforded competent counsel, and considering the
ruling in Stapley, it was anticipated that he would prevail. But in denying the
writ, Chief Judge Stanley distinguished Stapley as involving a more serious
crime, and also limited that case expressly "to the peculiar circumstances of
the case, including 'the frustration of the petitioner's efforts to obtain quali-
fied legal services because of his financial inability to pay for them,' cir-
cumstances not present here."' 03  The Chief Judge also pointed out that
LeBallister's military nonlawyer counsel "represented him at each trial ably
and as effectively as was possible under the circumstances,' 0 4 and then
he concluded with a statement of the traditional view regarding the rights
of military accused:
An accused before a military court is not entitled as a matter of
right under the Sixth Amendment to representation by legally
trained counsel. The right of an accused to be so represented at
99. Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
100. Id. at 319.
101. Id.
102. 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kans. 1965).
103. Id. at 352.
104. Id. at 351.
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a general court-martial springs not from the Sixth Amendment,
but from the action of Congress under Section 8, Article I of the
Constitution. No such right is accorded by Congress to one
being tried by special court-martial. 10
LeBallister was followed by Kennedy v. Commandant00 where the court
stated that the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to provide for
trials in the armed forces, 10 7 and that military personnel derive their rights
not from the courts, but from the Congress.
The Military Justice Act of 1968 amended Article 19,108 Uniform Code
of Military Justice, so that a special court-martial may not impose a bad
conduct discharge unless a qualified lawyer is detailed as defense counsel.
This has ended the punitive separation of servicemen represented only by
officers untrained in the law. Article 27,109 Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, has also been amended so that in all other special courts-martial, the ac-
cused must be afforded certified counsel unless such counsel can not be ob-
tained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies. In that event,
the convening authority must make a detailed written statement as an append-
age to the record of trial, relating why lawyer counsel could not be obtained.
In actual practice in the Army, lawyer defense counsel are being provided
in every case, even in Vietnam, if the accused so requests. The Judge Ad-
vocate General of the Army has certified numerous lawyers who are not
members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and the size of the Corps
itself has been increased in order to meet the increased demands for legal
representation.
We recommend that additional steps be taken to assure that military law-
yer defense counsel are fully free to defend their clients. An independent,
central defense organization should be created in each of the armed services
with all general court-martial defense counsel assigned as a part thereof,
with duty stations in the field. In this manner, defense counsel would be
always serving under and rated by other defense counsel within the defense
framework of the service involved. 10
In addition, the services should consider authorizing military defense
counsel to file writs of habeas corpus on behalf of their clients in appro-
priate cases in Federal district courts. It is noted that when a soldier secures
105. Id. at 352.
106. 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967), motion for writ of habeas corpus denied, 389
U.S. 807 (1967).
107. Id. at 342.
108. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (Supp. IV, 1969).
109. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (Supp. IV, 1969).




a civilian lawyer at his own expense and asserts his rights in the federal
courts, the Government reply is frequently written by a military officer as-
signed to the Litigation Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General,
Department of the Army. It would appear only fair to provide the soldier
with equal assistance.
Post-Trial "Bail"
Historically, a military accused could not secure his release pending appeal.
However, the addition of Article 57(d)"' to the Code now permits the
deferment of a sentence to confinement pending appellate review. This is
the military equivalent of the civilian bail pending appeal; it must be clearly
understood, however, that it is not in the nature of clemency. Deferment
results in postponing the serving of a sentence to confinement, and if the
deferment itself is rescinded for any reason, or if the sentence is ordered
executed, the confinement time may have to be served unless relief is given
on a purely discretionary basis.
The application for deferment must be made to the convening authority,
or if the accused has been transferred, the officer exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction over the accused. Deferment is appropriate in those
cases where there is "likelihood of success" on appellate review or where
policy reasons justify deferment. 112  Likelihood of success is not tested by
the reasonable doubt standard, but may be found in all cases having a sub-
stantial question of law.
11
Action on a deferment application is discretionary with the officer em-
powered to grant deferment. The nature of the discretion residing in the
empowered officer has been characterized "as sole and plenary. This was
done in order to assure the greatest possible freedom of action on the part
of the officer possessing this authority."" 4 This language will make it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to contest denials of deferments. It appears that the
only issue which may be litigated is abuse of discretion. It is clear that
denials are appealable administratively to the next higher commander or to
the Judge Advocate General in cases undergoing review pursuant to Article
66, Uniform Code of Military Justice." 5
As noted, deferment terminates upon the ordering of a sentence into exe-
cution, and thereafter confinement may be either approved, or suspended,
111. 10 U.S.C. § 857(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
112. FED. R. CRiM. P. 46(a)(2) (appeal must not be frivolous or taken for delay).
113. See Cohen v. United States, 277 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 865 (1962).
114. % 88f, Analysis of Contents, MCM, (1969 (Rev.).
115. This is the Army practice. See DA Message 940385 (Feb. 6, 1970).
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but it may not be further deferred. Prior to execution, the deferment may
be rescinded at any time. There is some conflict on the authority to rescind
deferment because while the implementing Manual provides that the power
is "sole and plenary,""1 " that phrase is conspicuously absent from Article
57(d). The intent of the Manual is apparently to deny servicemen a right
to a hearing before deferment is rescinded.
Deferment of serving a sentence to confinement may prove to be one of
the most useful tools found in the amendments of the 1968 act. While it has
not been used on any significant scale since the effective date of the provi-
sion, it has been applied to a few cases."
7
Command Influence Prohibited
Instances of illegal command influence in the Army have been rare under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Code was in effect more than
ten years before the first significant case reached the military's highest
court in 1961,118 and another six years passed before the court again acted
on this issue." 9 In the latter instance, it has been reported informally that
the command may have been operating under an outdated Manual for
Courts-Martial 120 at the time of the trials therein involved.
Accordingly, the 1968 amendments to the Code made only two minor
changes relating to unlawfully influencing the action of courts. Statutory
recognition was given to the need of commanders to provide general in-
structional or informational courses in military justice,' 2 ' while withdraw-
ing from them the authority to consider the court-martial performance of




The amendment affecting the summary court-martial, in effect, guarantees
a serviceman easy access to special courts-martial, and lawyer defense coun-
sel.' 23  Under prior law, a serviceman was allowed to refuse trial by sum-
116. 88g, MCM, 1969, (Rev.).
117. The most noteworthy of which is a Green Beret officer sentenced to twenty-
four years' confinement at hard labor for murder. United States v. McCarthy, No.
417936 (Pending decision before the United States Army Court of Military Review).
118. United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175 (1961).
119. United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967).
120. The convening authority reportedly was using the 1928 version of the MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL in making his decisions about courts-martial procedures. At the
time, that Manual and the 1949 Manual had been replaced by the 1951 Manual.
121. 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
122. Id. § 837(b).
123. Id. § 820.
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mary court-martial only if he had not previously been offered and had re-
fused disposition of his case by non-judicial punishment.124 Now servicemen
have an absolute right to object to trial by summary court-martial, and they
may thereafter be tried either by special or general courts-martial. 125 Con-
sequently, regardless of how minor the offenses might be, servicemen may
now refuse nonjudicial punishment (except when attached to or embarked in
a vessel) and summary courts-martial. They may obtain trial by a higher
court, lawyer defense counsel, automatic appeals upon convictions, and other
incidental rights. Under these circumstances, anyone now tried by sum-
mary courts-martial probably prefers such a trial because of the limited
punishment powers of this court.126 Thus, it can be anticipated that sum-
mary courts-martial will no longer be an object of attack to military jus-
tice reformers.
Post-Conviction Remedies
Substantive changes have been made improving two forms of military post-
conviction relief. The time period in which petitions for new trials may
be filed has been extended from one to two years. 127 In addition, this pro-
vision was expanded to apply to all courts-martial, 28 while its predecessor
applied only where the sentence extended to "death, dismissal, dishonorable
or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more."'
129
Another change concerns extraordinary relief which may be granted
in those cases not within the review jurisdiction, or otherwise not reviewed
by, a Court of Military Review. In these cases, even though normal appel-
late review has been completed, the accused may apply to the Judge Advo-
cate General of his service for extraordinary relief which may be given on
the basis of newly discovered evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdic-
tion, or errors prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused. 130 The
primary advantage of this provision is that it provides a more objective review
of those many summary and special courts-martial otherwise reviewed solely
within the command in which they were tried in the field.
124. Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
125. The proposed bill, S. 759, would have abolished the summary court-martial,
but the Department of Defense objected to this action. See 1966 Hearings at 619-25.
126. A summary court-martial may confine for one month, punish by hard labor
without confinement for 45 days, forfeit two-thirds of a soldier's pay for one month,
and impose certain reductions in grade.
127. 10 U.S.C. § 873 (Supp. IV, 1969).
128. It was an anomaly that whether one had a right to a new trial depended upon
the severity of his sentence.
129. Art. 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1964).
130. 10 U.S.C. § 869 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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The Convening Authority: Locus of Power
True power in our system of military justice resides not in the military
judge, the staff judge advocate, or any other legal functionary, but in the
convening authority. In military justice, the power of the convening au-
thority transcends anything found in our federal or state system of criminal
justice. It is not wide of the mark to say that in the British system of military
justice of 1775, and in our own early system of military justice (taken from
the British, as we have indicated, supra) the power of the convening au-
thority was almost absolute.' 3 ' In examining the current civilianization of
our military justice system, it can be readily discerned through even the
most superficial examination that the power of the convening authority has
been diminished over the years. Whether the convening authority still retains
too much power, however, remains as a relevant inquiry.
Under the Code, a military commander who has information indicating
that a person subject to his authority is implicated in the commission of an
offense cognizable by courts-martial must "determine what disposition should
be made thereof in the interest of justice and discipline .... ,,132 Although
justice is mentioned first by the Code, discipline is, even today, of vital con-
cern to commanders. 1 3  We do not argue, given the nature of military
operations in the field against an enemy force, and the constant necessity to
maintain troops in a state of readiness for such operations, that there is any-
thing wrong with any military commander being more concerned profession-
ally with discipline than with justice. As one irate commander told his staff
judge advocate, in an apocryphal story from the Second World War, "We're
over here to fight the Germans, not to sue them." But we suggest that in
view of the understandably paramount concern of any commander for
discipline, he is not the official who should wield almost total judicial power
in our system of military justice. Our regret concerning his desire for disci-
pline stems from the fact that the commander does wield almost complete
judicial power, not from the fact that the commander wants discipline more
131. "[T]he function of a court-martial is, regularly, completed in its arriving at a
sentence or acquittal, and reporting its perfected proceedings, its judgment, so far as
concerns the execution of the same, is incomplete and inconclusive, being in the nature
of a recommendation only. The record of the court is but the report and opinion of a
body of officers, addressed to the superior who ordered them to make it, and such
opinion remains without effect or result until reviewed and concurred in, or otherwise
acted upon, by [the convening authority]." WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PREC-
EDENTS 447 (2d ed. 1920).
132. Art. 30, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1964).
133. See Ryker, The New French Code of Military Justice, 44 MIL. L. REV. 71, 93
(1969) where that author states that "the aims of our two systems of military justice
[French and American] are the same-swift enforcement of military order and dis-
cipline while guaranteeing to the accused the maximum legal protections reasonably
available under the circumstances."
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than he wants justice. Since military operations per se are almost the antith-
esis of the judicial process, we think it is futile to waste time berating com-
manders for not acting like justices of the Supreme Court. Indeed, we sug-
gest that a commander whose primary concern is justice instead of the ac-
complishment of his military mission, certainly stands outside the tradition
of great military leaders and probably is less effective as a soldier for doing
so. It would be just as unreasonable to expect a military commander to
have the same degree of concern for the preservation of human life and
the prevention of suffering as that entertained by a physician.
In any event, in determining what disposition should be made of a given
case, the convening authority will make, or will cause to be made, a pre-
liminary inquiry to enable him to make an intelligent disposition of the mat-
ter.184 If the allegations are so serious that dispositions by general court-
martial may be appropriate, then an investigation must be conducted by a
commissioned officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 32 of the
Code.8 5 It has been suggested by some commentators that the Article 32
investigation takes the place of, and in most respects is entirely superior to, a
civilian grand jury investigation.1 36  Justice Douglas, writing for the ma-
jority in O'Callahan v. Parker,'17 obviously does not agree. He commented:
We have concluded that the crime to be under military jurisdiction
must be service connected, lest "cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger," [footnote omitted] as used in the Fifth Amend-
ment, be expanded to deprive every member of the armed services
of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by
a jury of his peers.1
3 8
We think that the liberal discovery practice made possible by the Article 32
investigation is superior to the secrecy of civilian grand jury proceedings,
and we question whether grand jury secrecy is really necessary as main-
tained in most civilian jurisdictions. But we also think that the civilian
grand jury is far more independent than the Article 32 investigating officer,
and certainly has more control over the decision of whether to try an
accused or dismiss the charges against him. Certainly there are those who
assert that the grand jury is obsolescent, and that its functions have been
turned over to the prosecutor for all practical purposes. 89 Yet, there are
134. 32-35 MCM, 1969 (Rev.).
135. Art. 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
136. Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a Civilian
Defendant, 22 MAINE L. REV. 105, 109-14 (1970); Murphy, The Formal Pretrial In-
vestigation, 12 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1961); cf. Quinn, Some Comparisons Between
Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1240, 1241-43 (1968).
137. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
138. Id. at 272.
139. I. CALLISON, COURTS OF INJUSrTcE 408 (1956).
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striking instances of grand jury independence to be found, even in modem
American jurisprudence.140  We are not prepared to say that the Supreme
Court is wrong in attaching some value to the grand jury as an institution.
But the real problem with military law at this stage of a criminal case is not
that the Article 32 investigation, per se, is inferior in any way to the investi-
gation conducted by a grand jury. The real problem is that, once again, as
all through military law, the convening authority holds ultimate power, not
the Article 32 investigating officer.
The Article 32 officer forwards a report of his investigation to the con-
vening authority, along with recommendations as to disposition.' 41 The con-
vening authority, however, is in no way bound by the advice of the Article
32 officer.142 Similarly, although the staff judge advocate must prepare
a summary for the convening authority's consideration of the case (called an
"advice" in military law), the convening authority is not bound to follow the
recommendations of his staff judge advocate. It is true that the Code pro-
vides that a commander may not refer a charge to a general court-martial for
trial unless he has found that the charge alleges an offense under the Code
and is warranted by evidence indicated in the report of investigation. 148  He
may nevertheless send the case back to the Article 32 investigating officer,
or appoint a new one, if he disagrees with the findings made in the initial
(or any subsequent) report. 44
As Justice Black pointed out, "Grand juries investigate, and the usual
end of their investigation is either a report, a 'no-bill' or an indictment.' 1 45
The grand jury is in no way obligated to the prosecutor. Contrast that with
the situation of the Article 32 investigating officer, who enjoys none of the
protections afforded a military judge. The Article 32 officer is usually a
member of the local command, and is usually a line officer rather than a
member of a Judge Advocate General's Corps. He is rated by local com-
manders, who themselves may be rated by the convening authority involved.
140. An instructive example is the action of the grand jury that indicted Mr.
Adam Clayton Powell in 1958 for income tax evasion. For different points of view as
to the propriety of that grand jury's action, see E. WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM
206-24 (1962) and W. BUCKLEY, RUMBLES LEFT AND RIGHT 76-83 (MacFadden
ed. 1964).
141. Art. 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
142. In United States v. Cunningham, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 30 C.M.R. 402 (1961),
Judge Ferguson said: "A pretrial investigation conducted under the provisions of
Code, supra, Article 32, is designed to obtain an impartial inquiry into the facts and
circumstances surrounding the charges against the accused and to gain a soundly con-
ceived recommendation concerning their disposition." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 404,
30 C.M.R. at 404.
143. Art. 34, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 834 (1964).
144. United States v. Smelley, 33 C.M.R. 516 (1962).
145. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 264 (1948).
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The opportunities for command influence are virtually unlimited, insofar as
the relationship between the Article 32 officer and the convening authority
is concerned. The Article 32 investigating officer is not independent, and
his findings and recommendations are purely tentative, insofar as the con-
vening authority is concerned. In the vast majority of cases, convening au-
thorities do follow the recommendations of the Article 32 investigating
officers on cases in their commands, and they do follow the advice and
recommendations of their staff judge advocates. But the point is that they
are not obliged to do so by law. As the Army's official guide for staff judge
advocates states:
In the final analysis the decision of the commander determines
whether charges are referred to a general court-martial, disposed of
by reference to an inferior court-martial, or disposed of by the
imposition of non-judicial punishment under Article 15.146
It is significant to note in passing that the staff judge advocate is told,
through official Army publications, that his primary business is to serve his
commander and no one else. Adopting the general point of view of the
military services that discipline is an important consideration, the Army's
guide for staff judge advocates states: "Military justice in a very real sense
represents the correctional side of military discipline."'1 47 That guide also
reads:
The convening authority therefore has a vital and continuing in-
terest in the status of military justice administration in his com-
mand. He will evaluate his staff judge adovcate in a large meas-
ure by the effectiveness and quality of legal service in the area
of military justice.'
48
The guide advises: "The staff judge advocate must acquaint himself with
the personality and the policies of his commander."'1 49 This is true because
"a poorly tried case reflects adversely on the command."' 150 When it is
remembered that the staff judge advocate, who occupies the position indi-
cated by the above quoted excerpts, plays a significant role in assisting the
convening authority in decisions about who shall be tried and who shall
not be tried, it becomes clear that the Article 32 investigation, for all its
virtues, is not quite what it is frequently represented to be. The convening
authority must consider the Article 32 investigation report, but that report
is interpreted for the convening authority by the staff judge advocate, and
146. Department of Army Pamphlet 27-5, STAFF JuDGE ADVOCATE HANDBOOK 8
(July 19, 1963) [hereinafter cited SJA HANDBOOK].
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id. at 7-8.
149. Id. at 8.
150. id. at 11.
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as the Army's guide makes plain:
First, the staff judge advocate of a command is a staff officer and,
as such, has the duty to assist the commander to command ef-
fectively and to accomplish the assigned mission. Second, as a
judge advocate he is the military legal advisor to the commander.151
In the final analysis, according to the Army:
The staff judge, advocate should accommodate himself to the
convening authority. By this it is not meant that he be servile
in any derogatory sense, rather, that he be responsive under all
the circumstances.
152
And the staff judge advocate is informed that he must keep in mind that:
As his efficiency report will usually be prepared by the chief of
staff, the staff judge advocated must be a working and coopera-
tive member of the staff.'
5 3
But the power of the convening authority is not limited to the obvious de-
gree of control that he has over the initial investigative stage of the cases
in his command, and the decision of whether to bring any given case to trial.
The Court of Military Appeals candidly acknowledged this in United States
v. Kirsch54 when it said:
Congress did not merely invest the commander with authority to
decide whether to dismiss or drop a charge before trial. It also
conferred upon him the power to free an accused from the
penalty of any offense committed by him in violation of the
Uniform Code, if he believes such action would further the ac-
complishment of the military mission. By virtue of that power,
a commander having court-martial jurisdiction can set aside even
a judicial determination of guilt.15
The court commented on what it subsequently termed "the vastness of the
power" 56 of the convening authority, in United States v. Massey:5 7
The legislative history of the Code makes it clear beyond doubt
that the words 'in his discretion' were intended to grant to the
convening authority an exceedingly broad power to disapprove a
finding or a sentence. Originally these words were absent from
the Code's draft. However, from the first the official commen-
tary on the proposed Article 64 of the Code stated that the con-
vening authority "may disapprove a finding or a sentence for
any reason ... " Certain of the colloquy concerning the drafts-
151. Id. at 75.
152. Id. at 76.
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964).
155. Id. at 91, 35 C.M.R. at 63.
156. Id.
157. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 514, 18 C.M.R. 138 (1955).
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men's intention is highly pertinent ...
"Mr. BROOKS. He [the convening authority] doesn't have
to read the record or anything esle [sic]. He can just say disap-
proved and it is through.
Mr. LARKIN. That is right." 158
If the power to set aside the findings and sentence "for no reason at all" does
not seem clear enough in light of the above, consider the further observa-
tions of the Court of Military Appeals in the Kirsch case:
The transcendental nature of the power of a commander having
courts-martial authority to exonerate from punishment is further
evidenced by the fact that he need not wait until conviction to
exercise it. At any stage of the trial he can order the charges with-
drawn, and the trial discontinued. . . . Congress placed no limi-
tation whatever on the exercise of this power .... 159
At first glance, this power of the convening authority to set aside all find-
ings of guilty and all sentences "for no reason at all" appears to be a salutary
infusion of commendable clemency power into our system of military jus-
tice. But there are other implications of such power in the hands of con-
vening authorities. Two examples should suffice. What becomes, for ex-
ample, of the charges brought by a hypothetical Army private against a com-
missioned officer for unlawful confinement of the private in violation of
Article 97,160 if the convening authority decides to dismiss the case "for no
reason at all"? What becomes of the charges, brought by any hypothetical
accused person, against, say, a convening authority himself for unnecessary
delay in the disposition of charges against that accused person in violation of
Article 98,161 if the superior convening authority decides, "for no reason
at all" to dismiss that complaint of unnecessary delay? It is interesting, and
it is highly significant, that in the entire history of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, there has never been a single prosecution against anyone
for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case, even though there are
numerous instances of reversals of convictions for such delay and denial of
the right of speedy trial. 162 In view of this almost absolute power of the
convening authority to insulate any and all members of his command from
the prosecution of any such charge, the total lack of prosecutions under
Article 98 is not surprising. And the Army's admonition to its staff judge
advocates in the official handbook, quoted supra, takes on greater signifi-
158. Id. at 520, 18 C.M.R. at 144.
159. 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 92, 35 C.M.R. at 64.
160. Art. 97, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 897 (1964).
161. Art. 98, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1964).
162. See United States v. Williams, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37 C.M.R. 209 (1967),
where there was a 318 day delay between arrest and trial.
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cance: "A poorly tried case reflects adversely on the command." 163
It is an illusion, therefore, to contend that military judges and staff judge
advocates have real control of the American system of military criminal
justice. Real control is where it has always been, and where it is quite
likely to remain: in the hands of the lay military commanding officers
who are the convening authorities.
Suggestions for Reform
We hesitate to set forth even the most tentative suggestions for reform of the
present system of military justice. This is not because we are unable to
perceive the problems: we trust that the foregoing discussion in this paper
indicates that we know that problems do exist, and that we know what the
most critical of those problems are.
It is not our purpose, however, to reform the system. It is our purpose
to allert the profession generally, military practitioners in particular, and
all others who are deeply interested in military justice, to the fact that the
problems not only exist, but are recognized by military lawyers and judges
themselves. Experience with previous reforms teaches that the detailed
provisions for needed legislative enactments must be hammered out in con-
gressional committees through the long and tedious processes of hearings,
proposed drafts, more hearings, more drafts, and the like. It is neither a
simple nor an easy process, and considerable legal and legislative talent is
required for each significant step forward. Not the least is the need for any
change to be consistent with overall needs of the armed services themselves.
Respect for the complexity of our national legislative process compels us
to refrain from advocating a detailed program for immediate enactment.
We leave that task to others. Instead we merely desire to indicate broadly
what reforms are necessary. With that qualification, then, we urge the fol-
lowing changes to the present system:
(1) Military trial judges must be made more like Federal district judges,
with tenure and the independence which follows from tenure. Their deci-
sions must not be subject to overruling action by lay military convening au-
thorities, or any other military authorities except duly constituted Courts
of Military Review or the Court of Military Appeals, and other Federal courts.
(2) Convening authorities must be divested of their power to determine
the membership of the courts-martial that they convene.164
(3) Defense counsel for all court-martial cases must be made truly in-
dependent, and fully insulated from the pressures that may now be exerted
on them.
163. SJA HANDBOOK at 11.
164. See Schiesser, Trial by Peers: Enlisted Members on Courts-Martial, 15
CATHOLIC L. REV. 171 (1966) for some detailed suggestions for changes in this area.
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(4) Judges of the Courts of Military Review must be given inde-
pendence and tenure adequate to enable them to discharge their responsi-
bilities.
(5) The Courts of Military Review must be specifically provided with
the authority to issue extraordinary writs in aid of their appellate jurisdiction.
These are the basic essentials. An outstanding step forward would be the
enactment, with minor modifications designed to strengthen the measures,
of the bills introduced in the Senate and House by Senator Tydings of Mary-
land and Representative Whalen of Ohio, respectively. 165 Those bills need
to provide for reform of special court-martial panels, as well as general
court-martial panels, and to the extent that they do not do so, they will not
fully accomplish the reforms envisioned by their sponsors. But they repre-
sent good first steps forward.
In conclusion, we desire to record our recognition of the difficulty in pro-
posing reforms of the kind indicated. With Charles Alan Wright, we know:
Any proposal for substantial change in any area of law is sure
to meet with determined opposition from those who have, or
think they have, a vested interest in preserving the status quo.
Lawyers are notoriously conservative-and notoriously short-
sighted.' 16
And yet, as Justice Frankfurter observed:
[E]very lawyer belongs to a system which, in the course of
seven or eight centuries, has done mightily to bring about as much
of civilization as we have today. It may be said that it is not too
much that we have achieved, but yet it is a great deal as com-
pared with the alternatives. It is the legal profession beyond any
other calling that is concerned with those establishments, those
processes, those criteria, those appeals to reason and right, which
have had a dominant share in begetting a civilized society.
167
Military justice is one of those establishments, one of those processes, with
which lawyers in this country must be concerned if military justice, ulti-
mately, is to evolve into an "appeal to reason and right" which will have a
significant share in begetting a civilized society. It is our hope that the
legal and military professions will act effectively in this area to meet the
need that exists.
165. See S. 3117, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 15016, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
166. Wright, John Frank and the Radical Reform of American Law: An Intro-
duction, 47 TEX. L. REV. 965, 967 (1969).
167. F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE & OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER 149
(1965).
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